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At some point in the not distant future, China will ease its capital con-
trols and make the yuan renminbi fully convertible into foreign currencies.
Shortly after, Shanghai will reemerge as an international ﬁnancial center.
Amid a broader debate over the competitiveness of major international 
ﬁnancial centers (McKinsey and Company 2006; Mainelli and Yeandle
2007), the prospect of Shanghai’s reemergence has sharpened speculation
regarding the relationship between Shanghai and the established inter-
national ﬁnancial center that has reverted to Chinese sovereignty, Hong
Kong (Wong 2007; Bradsher and Barboza 2007; Meyer 2007).
This study argues that Hong Kong will gain stature as an international
ﬁnancial center when China is more open ﬁnancially and Shanghai returns
as a competing center. This thesis is in the tradition of Kindleberger (1974),
who argued that federal states can support more than one ﬁnancial center.
The thesis that the development of an onshore international ﬁnancial cen-
ter can contribute to the development of a nearby oﬀshore international ﬁ-
nancial center is in some ways the inverse of that of Rose and Spiegel
(2007), who argue that oﬀshore competition can spur the onshore center.
This thesis is developed in relation to historical evidence of the last cen-
tury, the current range and intensity of ﬁnancial activity in the two centers,
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tional Settlements.and a prospective analysis of the evolution of China’s international balance
sheet and Hong Kong’s share therein. The method is eclectic, depending 
on rankings based on nosecounts of banks and their links for the historical
comparison, multidimensional measures of balance sheets and trading ac-
tivity for the current comparison, and regression analysis for projecting the
future.
The analysis is in three parts. The next section builds on the analysis of
1900 to 1980 in Reed (1981) to demonstrate that Hong Kong ranked higher
among international banking centers in the twentieth century when China
was ﬁnancially open, that is, before and just after the Second World War.
The following section supplements and updates the careful study of Jao
(2003) with data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS; 2002,
2005) and from Ho, Ma, and McCauley (2005), to emphasise the current
gap between Hong Kong and Shanghai, especially in the trading of foreign
exchange and derivatives. The value of Hong Kong’s legal and regulatory
institutions is discussed by reference to the gap between the valuations of
ﬁrms listed on the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges. The follow-
ing section draws on Lane (2000) and Cheung et al. (2006) to ﬁt a Kuznets
curve relating international banking assets and liabilities to real income
and openness in order to assess the potential growth of China’s interna-
tional banking activity. Then BIS and Hong Kong data are used to estimate
the share that Hong Kong can be expected to enjoy. A ﬁnal section con-
cludes that China’s ﬁnancial opening and Shanghai’s consequent reemer-
gence as an international ﬁnancial center promise to raise Hong Kong’s
standing vis-à-vis London and New York.
1.2 Hong Kong and Shanghai as International 
Financial Centers, 1900 to 1980
Reed (1981) based his analysis on ﬁve variables that combine the num-
ber of banks in a ﬁnancial center and their links to other ﬁnancial centers
(see appendix A for complete deﬁnitions). The ﬁrst two of these count the
number of locally headquartered banks and their international links. In
particular, both the number of internationally active banks that are head-
quartered in the center and the number of their links through aﬃliates to
other international ﬁnancial centers are counted. The other three variables
focus on the presence in the center of private and foreign banks. In partic-
ular, the number of merchant or investment bank oﬃces is counted. In ad-
dition, the number of oﬃces in the center of large, internationally active
banks that are headquartered outside the center is counted. Finally, in par-
allel with the count of links to other centers of locally headquartered banks,
the links to international ﬁnancial centers through oﬃces of large, inter-
nationally active banks headquartered elsewhere are counted.
Rankings based on these measures may be far from ideal, but they do
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of a century. In particular, Reed ranked the world’s international ﬁnancial
centers on this basis for sixteen selected years between 1900 and 1980, in-
clusive, at generally ﬁve-year intervals.
Reed’s rankings consistently put London and New York in the top posi-
tions. Asian ﬁnancial centers, including Hong Kong, Shanghai, Singapore,
Tientsin, Tokyo, and Yokohama, fell into the second or third tier of cen-
ters. Focusing on the three Asian centers of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and
Tokyo,1 ﬁgure 1.1 shows that Hong Kong started the century as the pre-
eminent Asian center, only to fall behind ﬁrst Shanghai then Yokohama
(aggregated with Tokyo in the graph) before World War II. Then, after
1960, Tokyo emerged as the preeminent center in Asia.
In terms of the comparison between Hong Kong and Shanghai, Reed
found that internationally active banks were better represented and more
connected to other centers in Hong Kong than in Shanghai. Reed put Shang-
hai ahead of Hong Kong in two years, 1925 and 1947. But even apart from
the Second World War and the Mao years, Shanghai did not make the inter-
national top ten in 1900, 1920, and 1930, while Hong Kong always placed.
The most striking aspect of these rankings, though, is the relationship
between Hong Kong’s ranking and Shanghai’s presence as a competitor.
Shanghai was no competition for Hong Kong during the Second World
War and the years after the founding of the People’s Republic. During these
years, Hong Kong averaged a ranking of 5.8 on Reed’s measure (where Lon-
don was ranked number one). In the years that Shanghai was, from an in-
ternational banking perspective, out of the picture, Hong Kong was ranked
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1. See Meyer (2007).
Fig. 1.1 Ranking of international ﬁnancial centers
Source: Reed (1981).
Notes: 11 denotes not in the top ten. Yokohama and Tokyo are considered one center.7.1 (see table 1.1). On this showing, Hong Kong did not beneﬁt as an in-
ternational banking center from the absence of Shanghai.
The result should not be surprising. Narrowly speaking, if banks head-
quartered in Shanghai tended to have aﬃliates in Hong Kong, then Hong
Kong would have tended to rise on Reed’s measure. More broadly, the en-
gagement of China with the world’s trading and ﬁnancial system raised the
weight in that system of East Asia and the ranking of those ﬁnancial cen-
ters that served it.
The suggestion conveyed by this look at Hong Kong and Shanghai as in-
ternational banking centers in the last century is that Hong Kong was
generally more populated with international banking units and more 
connected to other international banking centers than Shanghai. More
striking, however, is the suggestion of complementarity between the two
centers. Hong Kong seemed to have done better as an international bank-
ing center when Shanghai was open for business. The next section turns to
the current comparison of Hong Kong and Shanghai, in which Shanghai
is handicapped by the substantial restrictions on international capital mo-
bility between China and the rest of the world.
1.3 Hong Kong and Shanghai as International Financial Centers Today
This section extends and updates the quite comprehensive comparative
proﬁle of Hong Kong and Shanghai as ﬁnancial centers provided by Jao
(2003). It starts with Professor Jao’s proﬁle based on 2002 data and adds to
it some data from the triennial central bank survey compiled by the BIS,
mostly concerning over-the-counter derivatives. It then updates the ex-
tended proﬁle to end-2005 (except the data from the triennial survey, which
cover April 2004). Finally, the current advantage of Hong Kong’s institu-
tions and openness is measured by the price gap between the opportunity
cost that the Chinese authorities pay for listings of Chinese companies in
Hong Kong.
Jao’s conclusion from his proﬁle was stark: “Here, all indicators show
that Shanghai was dwarfed by Hong Kong” (19). One could footnote this
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Table 1.1 Ranking of Hong Kong and Shanghai as international banking centers,
1900–1980 (top ranked center is ranked number one)
Hong Kong Shanghai Diﬀerence
Shanghai active (1900–35, 1947) 5.8 8.0a 2.1
Shanghai inactive (1940, 1955–80) 7.1
Diﬀerence –1.3
Sources: Reed (1981) and authors’ calculations.
aA rank of 11 is assigned to Shanghai in the years that it did not make the top ten. If only the
years when Shanghai made the top ten were included, then Shanghai would show an average
ranking of 6.2 in the top row while Hong Kong would show an average ranking of 6.0.conclusion, for example, by noting that Hong Kong has no counterpart to
Shanghai’s commodity exchanges, which could eventually challenge the
London-based commodity exchanges. It is hard, however, to argue against
Professor Jao’s assessment. Indeed, when the comparison is broadened in
what follows to include derivative trading, his conclusion actually gains
strength. For instance, while billions of dollars worth of interest rate swaps
were traded every day in Hong Kong in April 2001 and 2004, the ﬁrst ren-
minbi swap had not yet been contracted then.2
But the question arises, particularly after the celebrated increase in the
market capitalization of the Shanghai stock exchange in 2007, how ﬁrmly
did this conclusion hold in middecade? It turns out that the updating of
Professor Jao’s comparison to 2005 does little damage to his conclusion.
As an international banking center, Shanghai lags Hong Kong (table
1.2). It must be admitted that broad, mostly domestic, banking aggregates,
like the deposits and loans on the ﬁrst and third rows of table 1.2, grew at
a much faster rate in Shanghai than in Hong Kong over the years 2002 to
2005, as one would expect given the more rapid economic growth on the
mainland. However, such growth tells more about Shanghai as a domestic
ﬁnancial center than as an international ﬁnancial center.3 Even using
China-wide data on cross-border interbank positions, Shanghai engage-
ment with the international interbank markets remained moderate in 2005,
at levels only about a third of those observed in Hong Kong (see rows “Due
to” and “Due from banks abroad” in table 1.2). On this showing, Shang-
hai has a way to go to become a major international banking center.
From the comparison of banking positions, the spotlight shifts to the
trading of foreign exchange and derivatives (table 1.3). At the outset, it
should be recognized that it is possible for an international ﬁnancial center
to operate largely on the basis of foreign currencies: consider the position
of London before the abolition of exchange controls on sterling in 1979. But
London was well established as an international ﬁnancial center before the
imposition of those controls, and policy sought to revive that role even un-
der the capital controls. In contrast, policy drove practically all interna-
tional banks out of Shanghai in the years after the founding of the People’s
Republic. For instance, Lu (2007) tells the story of the strained relations be-
tween the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank and the mainland authorities.
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2. The ﬁrst renminbi interest rate swap was contracted in connection with the Asian De-
velopment Bank’s (ADB) sale of a so-called panda bond denominated in renminbi to Chinese
investors in October 2005. The ADB reportedly exchanged its ten-year ﬁxed coupon pay-
ments for ﬂoating rate payments based on the one-year deposit rate in China.
3. Liu and Yang (2005) argue that Shanghai’s performance as a domestic ﬁnancial center
can be judged as unsatisfactory by the low ratio of loans to deposits in the Chinese banking
system. It is certainly true that nominal lending rates well below the Chinese economy’s
growth rate suggest that domestic ﬁnancial intermediation has serious problems. But by Liu
and Yang’s criterion, Hong Kong banks would be judged to have done a great job amid rising
asset prices in the early to mid-1990s (with a loan-to-deposit ratio in excess of one) and a poor
job since (with a low loan-to-deposit ratio).Whatever the possibilities in principle, in practice the gap between Hong
Kong and Shanghai in trading foreign exchange and derivatives is wider
than that in banking (table 1.3). The modal transaction in the exchange-
traded Shanghai spot currency market in 2004 must have been the pur-
chase of dollars against renminbi by the authorities. Most trading by non-
residents occurred oﬀshore in the nondeliverable forward market, with no
connection to payment ﬂows on the mainland by construction (Ma, Ho,
and McCauley 2004; Ho, Ma, and McCauley 2005; Debelle, Gyntelberg,
and Plumb 2006). Currency options and swaps were absent.
Moreover, the development of derivatives markets in ﬁxed income and
equity in China has been inhibited by a cautious oﬃcial approach that re-
ﬂects a bad experience with bond futures trading in the 1990s. Stock index
futures remained to be introduced in 2005. As noted, only in commodity
futures did Shanghai have an edge on Hong Kong. Indeed, because China
represents the fastest growing and probably most volatile source of de-
mand for commodities, it is not inconceivable that Shanghai traders might
have some informational advantages over their commodity-trading coun-
terparts in London and New York. For now, however, derivatives are more
studied than traded in Shanghai.
Turning from foreign exchange and derivatives to capital market devel-
opment, Shanghai has yet to derive the full measure of advantage over Hong
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Table 1.2 Banking assets and liabilities in Hong Kong and Shanghai (US$ billions)
Hong Kong Shanghai
2002 2005 2002 2005
Deposits 425.5 524.6 169.6 289.0
Foreign currency deposits 189.4 250.1 20.7 23.9
Loans 266.4 298.1 127.5 208.1
Foreign currency loans 66.2 83.9 14.3 30.0
Loans abroad 31.2 39.4
Due to banks abroad 180.9 200.7 32.3a 76.1a
Due from banks abroad 257.0 325.6 79.7a 110.5a
Clearing house turnover 39.5 79.0
Interbank market turnover 20.6 31.8 5.7 11.5
Memo: no. of depository institutions 224 199 72 130
Domestic 99 77 18 46
Foreign 125 122 54 84
Sources: Hong Kong: Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) Annual Report, Quarterly
Bulletin, and Monthly Statistical Bulletin; Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics; Hong
Kong Annual Report; Hong Kong Stock Exchange Fact Book; Hong Kong Securities and
Futures Commission Annual Report. Shanghai: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook; Shanghai
Economy Yearbook; China Statistical Yearbook; China Securities and Futures Statistical
Yearbook; BIS.
aChina ﬁgures.
Note: Blank cell means not reported.Kong from its very large government debt (table 1.4). Turnover of govern-
ment paper other than People’s Bank bills remained low, with trading awk-
wardly divided between the stock exchange and an over-the-counter inter-
bank market. Fixed income mutual funds and insurers’ holdings of bonds
were growing very rapidly but from a low base. As noted, ﬁxed income de-
rivatives were absent in 2005, although the development of repo markets
had allowed the possibility of short-sales. As for the international proﬁle
of the Chinese bond market, policy generally prevented foreign investment
in renminbi-denominated bonds.4
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Table 1.3 Foreign exchange and derivatives turnover in Hong Kong and Shanghai
(US$ billions)
Hong Kong Shanghai
2002 2005 2002 2005
Foreign exchange daily turnovera,b 68.351 105.979 0.61c,d
Spot 18.968 35.648 0.34 0.61c,d
Forward/swaps 47.855 66.514 —
Options 1.030 2.846 — —
Cross-currency swaps 0.498 0.971 — —





Over-the-counter ﬁxed income 
derivativesa,b 2.641 11.217
Forward rate agreements 0.531 0.318
Interest rate swaps 1.895 9.594
Interest rate options 0.215 1.305
Exchange traded derivatives
Stock index futures (no. of 
contracts, daily average) 19,602e 40,205e ——
Commodity futures — — 1.98 3.24
Sources: Hong Kong Stock Exchange Fact Book; Shanghai Statistical Yearbook; BIS Trien-
nial Survey (2002, 2005).
aApril 2001 for 2002.
bApril 2004 for 2005.
cChina ﬁgures.
dHo, Ma, and McCauley (2005) estimated that the daily renminbi turnover would be US$ 3.6
billions, in which US$ 2.9 billions would be spot turnover, if the unreported bank-customer
transactions were taken into account.
eHang Seng Index futures.
Blank cell means not reported. Dash means nil.
4. A limited exception was the Pan Asia Index Fund (EMEAP 2006; Ma and Remolona
2005). Another exception to the noninternationalized nature of the Chinese bond market was
the issuance of the panda bond by the Asian Development Bank in October 2005.Given the headlines in 2007 that the market capitalization of the Chinese
stock exchanges had surpassed those of the rest of Asia, table 1.4 oﬀers a re-
minder of how things were in 2005. The market capitalization of the Shang-
hai exchange was about a quarter of that of the Hong Kong exchange, and
turnover was less than half. Fund-raising in the market through 2005 re-
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Table 1.4 Capital market indicators in Hong Kong and Shanghai
Hong Kong Shanghai
2002 2005 2002 2005
Debt market (US$ billion)
Outstanding debt instruments 68.3 99.2 366.3a 910.9a
Government 16.4 17.7 215.2 610.7
Foreign 11.5 15.7 0.0 1.2
Other
Turnover 2.9 3.5 15.5a 3.2a
Stock market (US$ billion)
Market capitalisation 456.4 1,046.3 306.4 286.2
Daily turnover 0.83 2.35 0.84 0.99
Equity funds raised 13.0 38.5 0.67 0.37
Memo: no. of listed ﬁrms 812 934
Domestic 802. b 925. b 715 834
Foreign 10. c 9. c
Fund management
Assets under management 342.1 667.6
Memo: no. of unit trusts or 
mutual funds 1,965. d 1,998. e
Domestic 91. d 103. e 25 26
Foreign 1,874. d 1,895. e —
Insurance
Premium income (US$ billion) 11.4 17.7 2.9 4.1
No. of insurance companies 195 175 36 70
Domestic 96 89 21 46
Foreign 99 86 15 24
Sources: Hong Kong: Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) Annual Report, Quarterly
Bulletin, and Monthly Statistical Bulletin; Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics; Hong
Kong Annual Report; Hong Kong Stock Exchange Fact Book; Hong Kong Commissioner of
Insurance Annual Report; Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission Annual Report.
Shanghai: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook; Shanghai Economy Yearbook; China Statistical
Yearbook; China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook; Asian Development Bank; BIS.
Notes: Blank cell means not reported. Dash means nil.
aChina ﬁgures.
bAll China incorporated enterprises with H shares listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange
are included.
cCounted as foreign companies if incorporated overseas and have a majority of business out-
side Hong Kong SAR and China.
dMarch 2003.
eMarch 2006.mained negligible. Again, the Chinese equity markets were very insular,
with only about $10 billion of Qualiﬁed Foreign Institutional Investor in-
ﬂow permitted. Table 1.4 classiﬁes the listings of mainland ﬁrms on the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange as domestic. If these are taken to be foreign
listings, then the primary market oﬀerings on the Hong Kong Stock Ex-
change emerge as the most international in the world (ﬁg. 1.2).
In terms of price action, both the mainland equity and bond markets
moved without reference to global markets, as represented by the Standard
and Poor’s 500 or U.S. Treasury bonds (ﬁg. 1.3). In striking contrast is the
high correlation of Hong Kong bond and stock markets with global move-
ments.
Underlying Hong Kong’s current advantage are not only China’s capital
controls but also Hong Kong’s legal system; regulation, including account-
ing and disclosure standards; and clearing and settlement systems. The
value that the mainland authorities themselves place on Hong Kong’s insti-
tutions can be read from pricing diﬀerences between the Hong Kong and
Shanghai stock exchanges. The willingness of the mainland authorities to
pay for Hong Kong institutions is more evident in recent years owing to
greater overlap between the ﬁrms traded in Hong Kong and Shanghai.
For a long time there has been evidence of pricing diﬀerences between the
Hong Kong and Shanghai exchanges that suggested that the mainland au-
thorities were paying an opportunity cost for Hong Kong listings. In par-
ticular, Chinese-based enterprises in Hong Kong have long traded at price-
earnings ratios well below those of the Shanghai A shares (ﬁg. 1.4). But
drawing inferences from this pricing diﬀerence was never straightforward:
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Fig. 1.2 Share of initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) by foreign companies in major
stock exchanges: Percent of total IPO value
Source: McKinsey and Company (2006, 47).
Notes: Mainland Chinese IPOs considered “foreign” for Hong Kong purposes. Year-to-date
data complied as of November 2, 2006.the selection of shares to be listed in one or another market was by no means
random.
For some years, however, some ﬁrms listed in Hong Kong have been al-
lowed to list in Shanghai as well, and these permit an apples-to-apples 
comparison. At ﬁrst, these cross-listed ﬁrms were smallish ones with low
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Fig. 1.3 Bond and stock market correlations with the U.S. markets
Source: McCauley and Jiang (2004).
Notes: CN denotes China; HK, Hong Kong; IN, India; ID, Indonesia; KR, Korea; MY,
Malaysia; PH, the Philippines; SG, Singapore; TW, Taiwan, China; TH, Thailand; Asia, Asia
local bond index of HSBC; AU, Australia; XM, the euro area; JP, Japan. Bond market corre-
lation is based on weekly changes in benchmark yields at Thursday closing for Asia and
Wednesday closing for U.S. Treasuries. Stock market correlation is based on weekly changes
in stock market price indexes at Thursday closing from Asia and Wednesday closing for the
S&P 500. The period is from January 2001 to March 2004.
Fig. 1.4 Price-earning ratio for HSI China Enterprises Index and Shanghai 
A-share Index
Source: Bloomberg.turnover or large state ownership. But over time, larger ﬁrms with more
liquid shares and lower state ownership have been listed. As a result, it has
become sensible for the Hang Seng Index Company to compile a weighted
average index of the pricing premium of Shanghai prices over Hong Kong
prices for ﬁrms listed on both exchanges. The index started in January
2006, with only one ﬁrm that met the criteria of suﬃcient market capi-
talization, trading, and nonstate ownership share.5 This capitalization-
weighted index of cross-listed large ﬁrms shows the share prices in Shang-
hai going to a substantial premium over the prices for the same shares in
Hong Kong in 2007 (ﬁg. 1.5). The substantial gap in valuations of the iden-
tical shares in Hong Kong and Shanghai led Joseph Yam, chief executive
of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, to suggest that some arbitrage
mechanism like depository receipts be allowed in order to allow the oper-
ation of the law of one price (Joseph Yam 2007; Miao and Peng 2007). In
the event, the mainland authorities in 2007 increased the foreign invest-
ment quotas for qualiﬁed domestic institutional investors (banks, insurers,
and mutual funds) to $42 billion and permitted investment into equities as
well as ﬁxed income, but proposals to allow a “through train” of invest-
ment by mainland retail investors into Hong Kong listed shares were side-
tracked. This easing of capital controls would permit Chinese residents to
invest in Hong Kong-listed shares, but the prospect of same has not
brought prices in the two markets into line.
As long as the premium remains, a decision by the mainland authorities
to allow a listing in Hong Kong entails a substantial opportunity cost. By
revealed preference, this cost has as its compensation the legal, regulatory,
and market context of Hong Kong.
This interpretation gains strength from reports that the State Adminis-
tration of Foreign Exchange on the mainland is not permitting ﬁrms that
have initial public oﬀerings in Hong Kong to repatriate the proceeds.
Shirley Yam (2007) reported the case of China Railway Engineering Group,
a state-owned constructor of railways, which is to list simultaneously in
Hong Kong and Shanghai:
It is okay to give Hong Kong a cut in the listing pie. It is okay to let for-
eign investors share the proﬁts of the eﬀective monopoly. It is okay to put
a major state-owned enterprise under the regulation of an outsider. But
foreign money is not okay. (B12)
This policy, said to be applied to private Chinese enterprises that have
listed in Hong Kong recently, makes it very clear why the mainland au-
thorities are willing to “leave money on the table” in Hong Kong. It is not
a mercantilist hankering for foreign exchange. We attach little weight to the
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5. These criteria produce a sample with less divergent valuations than the universe of
shares cross-listed on the two exchanges. Peng, Miao, and Chow (2007) ﬁnd that, on average,
over the period since July 2005, the Shanghai prices of cross-listed shares trade at a premium
of 77 percent over the same shares in Hong Kong.desire to give Hong Kong a cut in the listing pie, that is, underwriting fees.
Rather, the opportunity cost of listing a state-owned enterprise in Hong
Kong is the purchase price of the Hong Kong regulation and the Hong
Kong (and thereby global) equity analysis.
In sum, extension and update of Jao’s comparison conﬁrm his ﬁnding
that Shanghai hardly registers as an international banking center. Still,
Shanghai’s role as a domestic ﬁnancial center is growing rapidly, and the
surge over the past couple of years of equity prices has drawn international
attention, if not international funds or listings, to its stock exchange. The
fact that the mainland authorities have been willing to continue to list
shares of big Chinese ﬁrms in Hong Kong despite the increasingly clear ev-
idence of the substantial cost of doing so has testiﬁed to the value that they
place on the Hong Kong market’s advantages, be they matters of law, reg-
ulation, or market participation. Less remarked has been the recent in-
crease in the value of cross-border deposits and loans held by Chinese
banks, especially vis-à-vis banks. The next section considers the implica-
tions for Shanghai and Hong Kong were such deposits and loans to grow
in line with China’s output and trade.
1.4 The Future of Shanghai and Its Implications for Hong Kong
This section investigates the near future of Shanghai as an international
ﬁnancial center. It focuses on only one form of international ﬁnance,
namely stocks of cross-border bank claims.
At present, the international ﬁnancial position of China reﬂects the his-
tory and the continued eﬃcacy of capital controls (Ma and McCauley
2008). Even though cross-border bank ﬂows, especially those between
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Fig. 1.5 Hang Seng China AH Index—Premium Index
Source: Hang Seng Indexes Company Limited.banks, have been less regulated than portfolio ﬂows, nevertheless, the stock
of international bank claims and liabilities of China is smaller than it
would be without various restrictions.
How much larger? This section addresses this question by estimating the
relationship between the sum of crossborder bank assets and liabilities in
relation to gross domestic product (GDP), on the one hand, and the level
of income and the openness of the underlying economy on the other. Fol-
lowing Lane (2000) and Cheung et al. (2006), the sample of economies on
which this relationship is estimated is that of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies on the ground
that these economies generally have reduced or eliminated controls on the
international mobility of capital. The estimated relationship is then used as
a benchmark for how China’s stocks of international bank assets and lia-
bilities might be expected to evolve as capital controls are removed.
How would Hong Kong share in China’s deepened ﬁnancial relations
with the rest of the world? Cheung et al. (2006) used a gravity model to es-
timate the Hong Kong stock market’s attraction to portfolio outﬂows from
the mainland. Here, a simpler approach is taken, relying on the level and
trend of the Hong Kong share in the BIS, reporting bank claims and lia-
bilities vis-à-vis China. In short, the current high share of Hong Kong in
China’s international banking assets and liabilities suggests that China’s
international opening would beneﬁt Hong Kong to a disproportionate
extent.
The following subsection reports the results of the benchmark regres-
sion of international banking positions on a small set of economic vari-
ables for the OECD countries. Then data on China’s income level and
openness are used to produce an estimate of the size of China’s uncon-
strained international banking positions in 2005 and 2012. Then, data
from the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the BIS are combined to
produce a projection of the Hong Kong share of China’s international
banking assets and liabilities. A ﬁnal section considers in more general
terms the relationship between Shanghai and Hong Kong over a longer
horizon.
1.4.1 International Banking Positions in the OECD
How large would China’s international banking position be were policy
as liberal as those found in the advanced economies? This question can be
approached by relating international banking positions to income and eco-
nomic openness in the OECD economies.
Following Lane (2000), the dependent variable is deﬁned as the sum of
cross-border banking loans and deposits in relation to GDP. Independent
variables are taken to be the log of GDP per capita, measured at market
prices, economic openness, deﬁned as the sum of imports and exports as a
fraction of GDP, domestic credit as a share of GDP, and the interest diﬀer-
Hong Kong and Shanghai: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow 25ential between the relevant currency and the U.S. dollar at the three-month
maturity. In addition are entered dummy variables for ﬁnancial centers
(Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and for the euro
area. The latter dummy is to take into account the sharp rise in the cross-
border banking positions that took place after the introduction of the euro
as a result of the uniﬁcation of the areawide short-term money market. Data
for the dependent variable are obtained from the BIS and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and for the other variables from the IMF.
In common with other such analyses, the results are much improved ex-
cluding Luxembourg from the sample (table 1.5). For the resulting sample,
GDP per capita and openness, as well as the dummies for the euro area and
for the ﬁnancial centers, all come in as signiﬁcant and show the expected
signs. Neither interest rates nor the depth of domestic credit market enter
signiﬁcantly. Excluding the lower income countries, namely Mexico, Slo-
vakia, and Turkey, does not materially aﬀect the results, though it does
raise the coeﬃcient on GDP per capita noticeably. Overall, the goodness of
ﬁt is comparable to that of the more inclusive regression analysis of the to-
tal international investment position as reported by Lane (2000, 522).6
As a check for robustness, we repeated the exercise excluding Ireland
from the sample as well (appendix B). The results were similar with regard
to the sign and signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients. The somewhat
lower estimated coeﬃcient on GDP per capita implies somewhat smaller
growth of China’s cross-border bank deposits and loans, but leaves the
broad result qualitatively similar.
At the suggestion of David Cook, we experimented with net foreign as-
sets as an explanatory variable. However, this variable did not prove to 
be statistically signiﬁcant. David Cook also suggested that we check the
“out of sample” ﬁt of the results on table 1.5 for Taiwan, China. In fact, 
the model result overstates international bank loans and deposits for this
economy.7
1.4.2 China’s Projected International Banking Position
Were China’s international banking balance sheet to respond to its
growing real income in line with the tendency in the OECD, it could expe-
rience very rapid growth. In particular, if the nominal GDP of China were
26 Robert N. McCauley and Eric Chan
6. Lane’s goodness of ﬁt for the total international investment position than for direct in-
vestment or portfolio positions may suggest that his implied goodness of ﬁt for the major
nondirect investment, nonportfolio position item, namely bank ﬂows, is as high or higher
than the level reported in table 1.5.
7. According to the estimated coeﬃcients in column (4) or (6) of table 1.5, the estimated
cross-border banking loans and deposits for Taiwan would be 60.3 percent or 52.8 percent of
GDP, compared to the actual number of 40.0 percent. The shortfall may reﬂect limitations on













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.to grow by 13 percent, with 10 percent nominal growth reinforced by a
trend nominal appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar of 3 percent,
then dollar GDP per capita could grow at 12.5 percent. In table 1.6, this
scenario (given the coeﬃcient of less than one-half estimated in column [4]
of table 1.5) would produce a 5.4 percent per annum growth in interna-
tional bank positions in relation to GDP. If trade is assumed to decelerate
from a rate of growth of 20 percent by 2 percent per annum, then it at ﬁrst
contributes to additional international bank positions and then reduces
them. On these assumptions, the mainland’s cross-border bank position
could quintuple over seven years to half of GDP, or $2.7 trillion.
1.4.3 Hong Kong’s Share of China’s Projected 
International Banking Position
Such an outcome could represent a lot of business for banks in Hong
Kong. To see this, consider what share that Hong Kong might end up with
of the $2.7 trillion in China’s international banking assets and liabilities
projected for the end of 2012. While Cheung et al. (2006) had to estimate
how investment in Hong Kong would depend on the size of the market and
its distance from the investor, the present estimation is much more straight-
forward. Inspection of Hong Kong’s share of China’s external assets and li-
abilities suggests that Hong Kong’s share, after a prolonged decline from
the time of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis until early 2003, has stabilized at about
40 percent (ﬁg. 1.6).
It remains to be demonstrated how such an increase in Hong Kong’s in-
ternational balance sheet would aﬀect its standing vis-à-vis New York and
London.8 At this stage, suﬃce it to say that China’s rapid growth and fur-
ther ﬁnancial integration with the world economy, like rapid growth and
further ﬁnancial integration in East and South Asia in general, can be ex-
pected to boost the region’s ﬁnancial centers, including Hong Kong.
1.4.4 Looking Ahead Further
We have argued in section 1.3 that Hong Kong as a ﬁnancial center ben-
eﬁts from its legal and regulatory institutions, not least in its attraction of
stock market listings from the mainland. In the longer term, the position of
Hong Kong and Shanghai as ﬁnancial centers depends on the character 
of legal and institutional convergence between the Special Administrative
Region and the mainland. It may be recalled that under Hong Kong’s Basic
Law, Hong Kong’s legal system is to remain separate from that of the rest
of China for the ﬁfty years after 1997. If the law and institutions governing
ﬁnancial markets in Shanghai converge to those characteristic of Hong
28 Robert N. McCauley and Eric Chan
8. The eﬀect would be indirect in the case of poll-based ratings like that of Mainelli and
Yeandle (2007), which puts Hong Kong third after London and New York. See Cheung and



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Kong today, then Shanghai will join Hong Kong as a major international
ﬁnancial center. If, however, the eventual convergence impairs the rule of
law and the predictability of the regulatory system in Hong Kong, then
both may end up as more national than international ﬁnancial centres.
In the former case, the maintenance of a separate monetary system in
Hong Kong well into the ﬁfty-year period after 1997 need not prove an im-
pediment to Hong Kong’s serving China as an international ﬁnancial cen-
ter. The relevant analogy might be the role of London vis-à-vis the euro
area.9 It must be admitted that the short-term money market benchmark
for the euro area is one grounded in the euro area and not in London (as
with U.S. dollar Libor; see McCauley 1999). Nevertheless, London has to
a considerable extent become the ﬁnancial center for the ﬁxed income mar-
ket of the euro area, notwithstanding the United Kingdom’s remaining
outside the euro area. The issue of the ﬁrst oﬀshore renminbi bond in Hong
Kong in July 2007 points in this direction.
1.5 Conclusion
It is easy journalism to write the story of the return of Shanghai as an in-
ternational ﬁnancial center as a threat to Hong Kong’s status as one. To be
sure, Hong Kong may well enjoy some advantages that should be seen as
transitory. The analogy might be the once-predominant position of the
port of Hong Kong in China’s external trade, which depended on political
decisions rather than practical economics. Hong Kong’s share of China’s
commodity trade is falling continuously. But ﬁnance is not the same as
30 Robert N. McCauley and Eric Chan
9. The authors are indebted to Andy Rose for this analogy.
Fig. 1.6 External loans and deposits vis-à-vis China
Sources: Hong Kong Monetary Authority; BIS; authors’ calculations.goods trade, and Hong Kong’s share of China’s external bank assets and li-
abilities is not falling. To write that Shanghai will displace Hong Kong is
just dog-bites-man journalism.
The man-bites-dog argument of this chapter is that the return of Shang-
hai might boost Hong Kong as an international ﬁnancial center. A certain
plausibility attaches to this view when it is realized that Hong Kong ranked
higher as an international banking center in the last century when Shang-
hai was in the running than when it was kept out of the game by interna-
tional war or national politics. With regard to international banking, at
least, China’s ﬁnancial integration into the global economy can be ex-
pected to bulk up Hong Kong’s balance sheet more than that of any other
center outside the mainland. There is a good prospect that Shanghai’s rein-
tegration into the global ﬁnancial system will not only narrow the gap be-
tween itself and Hong Kong but also narrow the gap between Hong Kong
and New York and London.
Appendix A
Reed’s Measures of International Banking Preeminence
Reed depends on the following ﬁve variables:
1. Local bank headquarters: The number of large internationally active
commercial banks headquartered in the center.
2. Local bank direct links:The number of foreign international ﬁnancial
centers with direct links to the international ﬁnancial center through the
large internationally active local banks headquartered in the center.
3. Private banks: The number of private (merchant or investment
banks) with an oﬃce in the center.
4. Foreign bank oﬃces: Large internationally active foreign commercial
banks with an oﬃce in the center.
5. Foreign bank direct links:Foreign international ﬁnancial centers with
direct links to the international ﬁnancial center through the large interna-
tionally active foreign banks with an oﬃce in the center.
Sources are adapted from Reed (1981, 10).
Hong Kong and Shanghai: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow 31Appendix B
Robustness Check: Excluding Ireland from the Regression
As a robustness test, we estimate our model by excluding Ireland, which
is not considered a ﬁnancial center in our sample but, as a low-tax host to
multinational corporate treasuries, has a sizable stock of external deposits
and loans in relation to GDP. The estimated results are consistent with our
previous ﬁndings, with GDP per capita, openness, as well as the dummies
for the euro area and for the ﬁnancial centers all being statistically signiﬁ-
cant and showing the expected signs, while interest rates and the depth of
domestic credit market being insigniﬁcant. These results still hold when we
leave out the lower-income countries.
Using the estimated coeﬃcients in table 1A.1 as well as our previous as-
sumptions on growth in GDP per capita and trade, we project that China’s
dollar GDP per capita would generate a 4 percent per annum growth in the
country’s international bank positions in relation to GDP (table 1A.2).
This would boost the mainland’s cross-border bank positions to 41 percent
of GDP, or US$2.2 trillion, by 2012.
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Comment David Cook
Introduction
The authors have written a compelling case arguing that Hong Kong will
continue to thrive as an international ﬁnancial center even as the further
development of the People’s Republic of China could result in the growth
of a rival ﬁnancial center in Shanghai. Certainly, current trends are very
positive. The ﬁnance, insurance, and business services (FIRE and business
services less real estate) sector made up less than 10 percent of Hong
Kong’s economy in 1990 but had grown to more than 17.5 percent in 2005.
This indicates both that integration into the mainland economy has not, in
fact, dampened the ﬁnancial industry in Hong Kong but also that contin-
ued performance of the sector is crucial for the overall macroeconomic
performance of the Special Administrative Region (SAR).
The authors make three basic points based on past historical data, pres-
ent trends, and a structural forecast of the future. First, in the prewar era,
both Shanghai and Hong Kong were measured as signiﬁcant international
ﬁnancial centers. Second, by many recent measurements, the depth and
breadth of Hong Kong’s ﬁnancial markets continue to exceed that of
Shanghai’s. Third, China’s international banking assets are likely to grow
dramatically in the future as the economy develops. If Hong Kong’s share
of China’s international banking continues to hold steady, rapid expansion
of Hong Kong’s banking will continue.
A central contribution of the chapter is a well-founded prediction of the
size of China’s external banking assets. The authors estimate a statistical
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